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Foreign Restrictions on U. S. Investment
HENRY T. KING, JR.*
THE CHANGED CURRENT INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
FOR THE U.S. LVESTOR* *
The past year has witnessed significant and far-reaching changes
in legal restrictions encountered by the U.S. corporate investor in
his overseas investment activities. New patterns of control and
decontrol appear to be emerging in key areas of the world, and the
U.S. corporate investor must be fully prepared to anticipate and
deal with them. In some areas completely new styles of participa-
tion for the U.S. investor have evolved while in others existing
patterns have been modified.
To date, U.S. and other foreign investors have not had, for the
most part, an opportunity to influence these new patterns of con-
trol and decontrol as they have evolved in host countries. This is
because the overseas investor has historically lacked a constituency
outside his own country. For the future, it seems increasingly im-
portant that a definable local constituency be developed so that the
* B.A. Yale College; LL.B. Yale Law School. Mr. King is currently
Chief Corporate International Counsel with TRW, Inc. The views ex-
pressed in this article are those of the writer as an individual and are
not necessarily those of TRW, Inc.
** Without wanting to appear to be a male chauvinist, I shall use the
masculine gender when referring to the U.S. corporate investor in pro-
nominal forms.
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foreign investor's views are considered when new control patterns
emerge or are developed. This, of course, does not mean direct po-
litical intervention by foreign corporate investors in the affairs of
other nations, but it does mean a group of host country nationals
who fully understand the foreign investor's objectives and how
these objectives may be related to host country objectives. Un-
fortunately, in the charged political climate of many countries, eco-
nomic issues are too frequently presented as confrontations be-
tween foreign investors and local interests whereas, in my view,
there is a greater commonality of interest than of conflict. Cer-
tainly, if we can assume that overseas investment can be mutually
beneficial to the foreign investor and the country involved, it
would seem desirable that these host nations should have the
benefit of the foreign investor's views in developing policy, if
only to complete or complement the information on which a
considered judgment or course of action can be based.
In traditionally free investment areas, such as the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, the past year has seen the development of tight
exchange controls affecting the financing of foreign-owned oper-
ations in Germany and the amendment of Germany's Cartel Law
to require government acquiescence either tacit or explicit to most
mergers or acquisitions by U.S. firms where the acquired firm has
over DM 50 million in sales. Moreover, after the decision of the
Court of Justice of the European Communities in Continental Can,'
the Commission of the European Communities (as expanded to in-
clude the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark) is currently con-
sidering a draft regulation of the Council which would not only set
up a new standard of illegality for mergers and acquisitions having
sufficiently adverse effects on competition but would also require
prior notice to the E.C. Commission of mergers or acquisitions in-
volving companies having sales above a certain amount-notice
which could result in Commission intervention.2
In Australia, where the U.S. investor heretofore has had a rela-
tively free hand, a new Takeovers Law was enacted in late 1972
which has, in practice, meant Australian government review, and
approval or disapproval, of all mergers or acquisitions involving
the acquisition by foreign firms of the stock of Australian firms.
1. Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co. Inc. v. EEC Commis-
sion, 12 COMM. MKT. L. REv. 199 (1973).
2. The current draft of the regulation as it relates to prior notice,
specifies total annual sales of one billion units of account (a unit of ac-
count being equal to a 1971 U.S. dollar), the only exception being in the
case of acquisitions of a company with sales under twenty million units
of account.
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Canada is also considering a similar law and may act on it this
year.
Mexico has codified and tightened by legislation its traditional
administrative controls over foreign investment. Mexicanization
(defined as over 50% Mexican ownership of an enterprise) is the
order of the day in Mexico. Venezuela has joined the Andean
Group which favors local majority ownership of local industry
and is committed to limiting profit transfers annually to 14% of
invested capital. In Argentina the government has placed a pre-
mium on Argentinization (51% Argentine ownership) in key in-
dustries, such as the auto parts industry, by severely limiting the
financing in Argentina of foreign-controlled firms, and by limiting
their right to introduce new products into their existing operations
without Argentinian participation.
In areas traditionally restrictive towards foreign investment,
such as Japan, the winds of change seem to be blowing the other
way. In 1973, Japan announced a liberalization program, the
avowed purpose of which is to open up to foreign participation
most industrial sectors in the Japanese economy. It is too early to
judge the effects of this liberalization, but at least on its face, it
represents a fundamental departure from prior Japanese policies.
In Spain liberalization has recently been under way, and a foreign
firm may currently acquire 50% of a Spanish company in most in-
dustrial sectors merely by giving the Spanish government notice
to such effect.
In some communist countries which previously had been closed
to U.S. equity participation, joint ventures between foreign in-
vestors and host government entities are now permitted, although
the foreign investor's participation must be on a minority basis.
Since 1967, Yugoslavia has permitted joint ventures between Yu-
goslav entities and foreign firms, and over 85 are now in existence.
In late 1972, Romania enacted a decree which allowed joint ven-
tures between Romanian entities and foreign firms, and already at
least one joint venture between an American firm (Control Data
Corporation) and a Romanian firm is in effect. There are clear in-
dications that other areas of Eastern Europe, such 'as Poland and
Hungary, will open up to the joint venture style of participation,
albeit on a modified basis, in the reasonably near future.
In evaluating the changes which have been occurring in the area
of foreign restrictions on U.S. investment, the U.S. investor must
attempt to put himself in the position of the host governments and
try to understand the policy and underlying economic reasons for
the changes. Also, the U.S. investor will want to examine the
change in a particular country to determine whether it is a rela-
tively isolated restriction or part of a larger emerging pattern.
In this sense, he may wish to determine its relationship to restric-
tions in other countries in the region. He will want to make an
assessment of where he thinks the country involved is ultimately
headed in its restrictions on foreign investment.
The U.S. investor can, in many areas, assume the existence of
differences between his political or economic philosophy and that
of the countries with which he is dealing. He must also be aware
of the nationalism which is rampant in certain areas of the world
today. But more and more we are seeing that differences in ide-
ology or philosophy do not foreclose business accommodation, and
this should be healthy in the long run. Suffice it to say that if the
investor is a guest in the host country, he must appreciate and at-
tune himself to differences between his ideology and those of the
country with which he deals, and he must be aware of the host
country's national interests as it interprets them.
Perhaps it is premature to assess the full effect of the recent and
dramatic changes in foreign restrictions on U.S. investment, and
to determine how to adequately accommodate to them. But if na-
tionalism continues to be as prevalent in Latin America as it cur-
rently is, perhaps the joint venture may be the best long-term
instrument for operating within this region. In the Iron Curtain
countries and Yugoslavia, the foreign investor can only go the
joint venture route. While the utilization of the joint venture de-
vice may mean that the U.S. investor does not play quite as sig-
nificant a role in the running of the overseas operations, fre-
quently he can retain negative control over critical actions of the
joint venture through the exercise of the right of veto. From a
strictly business point of view, the "forced" joint venture may
not be without some benefits, since an astute, knowledgeable local
partner may be helpful in a positive sense in averting for the for-
eign investor needless host country pitfalls and possible disasters.
In Europe, the dimensions of the U.S. investor's acquisition ac-
tivities may have to be scaled down in terms of the size of the
companies he can acquire, and he may find himself restricted in
certain European countries to smaller scale "seed"-type acqui-
sitions. In Japan, the U.S. investor will want to determine
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whether, in a culturally different area, a joint venture is still
not the most desirable means of market penetration in many
industries. "Going it alone" in this area may just not be prac-
ticable.
In assessing the effects of changes, the U.S. investor will want
to consider the use of additional means of market penetration such
as the license device. Where accompanied by a joint venture, this
may be a means of increasing the return on his investment, al-
though it may also be a factor considered by host countries such as
France in evaluating whether permission is required for acquisition
of a small equity interest in a domestic company. Furthermore,
there may be instances where the remittance of royalties and tech-
nical assistance fees is permitted, and the remittance of dividends
is not permitted, or is restricted. It may also be a means of
strengthening his relationship with his foreign partners and his
influence over joint venture activities.
The license device can be used in the patent, know-how, tech-
nical assistance or trademark areas, depending on the technical
resources of the U.S. partner and the legal structure in the host
country.
In developing his new styles of participation in response to the
changing international context, the U.S. investor must also keep
in mind the variable U.S. context in which he is operating. U.S.
regulations control the flow of his funds from the U.S. to over-
seas investments, and govern the flow of funds from his overseas
investments to the U.S. U.S. tax laws affect his overseas opera-
tions and will do so, in all probability, to a greater extent in the
future. U.S. antitrust laws can affect the market sphere of his
acquisition, licensing and joint venture activities. U.S. export and
transaction control laws may impinge on his transfers of technology
overseas and in the sales he may make from his overseas manu-
facturing operations.
With the foregoing backdrop covering the changed international
context in which the U.S. investor finds himself currently oper-
ating, it seems appropriate to proceed to an analysis of restrictions
which may impinge on the investor in any proposed transaction.
The purpose of such an analysis is to isolate those factors which
may be germane to legal or de facto restrictions on a proposed
investment in a given country. However, while this analysis may
be developed in terms of a pro forma checklist, caution demands
the checklist be used with discretion. This is because such a
checklist usually does not include the input of disciplines other
than the legal or financial disciplines which would be relevant to
a proposed transaction in a given country. These nonlegal and
nonfinancial disciplines could embrace the cultural, political, eco-
nomic, and religious factors which would have to be weighed in
making a given investment in a specific country. Let it suffice to
say that a transaction analysis cannot be completely mechanical or
stereotyped but must deal with the total current context of the
country in which the proposed investment is being made; and it is
perhaps, in a deeper sense, more of an art than an exact science.
A ThANSACTIoN ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN LEGAL AND DE FACTO
REsTRIcTIONs AFFECTING U.S. INVESTMENT OVERSEAS
An analysis such as this requires the development of 'a precise
list of particulars, and the quality of the analysis will depend upon
the precision and comprehensiveness of the questions asked.
Some of the questions which seem appropriate in developing
and evaluating the restrictions which may affect a given host coun-
try investment would include the following:
(1) What is the nature of the industry involved? Is it spe-
cially regulated? Special rules may apply in natural resource in-
dustries as, for example, in Brazil where the foreign investor must
take a minority position in mining, and in Mexico where foreign
equity participation in the petroleum industry is prohibited (ex-
cept in the marketing area). In many countries, special prohibi-
tions will be applicable to foreign investments in shipping, bank-
ing, insurance, communications media, and public utilities indus-
tries which will not be applicable to investments in other indus-
tries. In Japan, the nuclear, aircraft manufacturing and arma-
ments industries, as well as certain other industries, will be closed
to foreigners. It must be kept in mind that in some industries
there will be outright prohibitions on foreign ownership, while in
other industries there will be merely restrictions on the percentage
of foreign equity ownership.
(2) Will the method of investment be 'a buyout of an existing
company, or the establishment of a new plant, as in an investment
incentive area? The method of investment employed may trigger
the application of special regulations or differing policies. Until
now, France and Japan have been more restrictive, in many in-
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stances, in their approach towards foreign buyouts, in part or whole,
of existing companies owned indigenously, than towards the estab-
lishment of a new company and/or new facilities on a startup basis.
(3) What is the percentage of ownership sought? (Portfolio
investment involving the purchase of an interest of less than 10%
is not within the scope of this article.) In India, Mexico, Romania
and Yugoslavia, an equity interest of only 49% or less can generally
be obtained by the foreign investor; this has also been true for most
industries in Japan, at least up to the 1973 liberalization program.
In some cases the foreign owner's equity investment may have to
be less than 49%, and in Yugoslavia he will not obtain any intrinsic
equity rights himself in the joint venture as a 49% owner, but, as a
practical matter, will have a claim against his Yugoslav partners,
with statutory support.
If there are to be partners, will they be local or foreign? In
Argentina, there are special advantages to having local rather than
foreign partners. In Brazil there are special advantages to being
an open company with a substantial number of Brazilian stock-
holders.
It is important, when considering taking a minority ownership,
to make certain of at least a 20% ownership since foreign earnings
cannot be consolidated for U.S. accounting purposes if the invest-
ment is less than 20%. For U.S. tax purposes, a 10% or greater
voting interest is required to claim a foreign tax credit; the indi-
rect interest must be at least 5% where second and third tiers are
involved.
(4) What is the relative size of the investment, and what is the
extent of competition? In Belgium, prior notice of acquisition of
substantial interests in Belgian companies is required only when
the net assets are worth at least BFR 100 million. In the United
Kingdom (hereinafter referred to as U.K.), investments of over five
million pounds and investments in industries where the market
shares of buyer and seller exceed 33-1/3% are subject to review by
the Department of Trade and Industry and possible referral to the
Monopolies Commission. The Department of Trade and Industry
may check with customers in the industry involved to get their
reaction to the acquisition. In France, a domestic competitor may
try to intervene against a buyout of a French company by a foreign
investor, but the intervention would not be on antitrust or mo-
nopoly grounds. The French Government might then proceed to
determine whether there was a possible French solution in the
matter, whereby French interests would undertake the purchase.
(5) What form will the investment take? Will it be an invest-
ment of cash, of used or new machinery, or of patents and tech-
nology? Will it be an investment in exchange for stock of the U.S.
company? If it is a contribution of assets, there may be de facto
restrictions connected with its valuation. For example, in Japan
and Brazil there are certain procedures which must be undertaken
in valuing an assets' contribution for investment purposes, and
strict compliance with these procedures is required. In addition, in
some countries, such as Spain or India, there are restrictions on the
compensation which a foreign investor can get from his local sub-
sidiary for an investment of technology. There may, in fact, be
restrictions on the investment itself, such as in Germany where
reinvested earnings are subject to a 25% tax while cash dividends
are subject to only a 15% withholding tax. In the U.K., there are
also de facto restrictions in the form of penalties on the use of U.S.
company stock to make the acquisition, since the seller will be sub-
ject to a "switch and surrender" operation involving the acquisition
and surrender of investment currency.
(6) If the investor is buying out an existing company, are
stocks or assets being purchased? And who are the sellers? The
acquisition of stock in an Australian company by a foreign investor
is subject to clearance by the Exchange Control authorities who,
in turn, refer the acquisition as proposed to the Committee on
Takeovers. Purchases of assets are not yet covered by the "Take-
over" legislation, although this situation may be changed in the
near future.
In addition, if the sellers of the stock in the company being pur-
chased are foreign sellers not indigenous to the country involved,
the host government may be inclined to view the purchase with
comparative indifference, although this is by no means uniformly
the case.
(7) If the investment is for purposes of establishing a new
business enterprise rather than a buyout of an existing company,
what legal form will the new investment take? Will it be a branch
of the U.S. company, a foreign subsidiary of the U.S. parent com-
pany, or a foreign branch of a U.S. domestic subsidiary of the
U.S. parent company? In each case, the ground rules will be
different. For example, a branch of a U.S. company will be
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permitted to deduct startup losses for U.S. tax purposes, but would
create a "permanent establishment" in the foreign country giving
rise to adverse tax and jurisdictional effects. The answer may be
to establish the new operation as a branch of a U.S. subsidiary if
a consolidated U.S. tax return is filed. On the other hand, in de-
veloping a final answer to this question one cannot ignore the in-
vestment laws of the country involved.
(8) What will be the proposed market area of the investment?
Will it be primarily in the country in which the investment is lo-
cated, or will it be primarily for exports? In Romania, the ability
of the foreign investor's local partner to obtain government ap-
provals of the investment in a 49% foreign-owned joint venture
will depend on his ability to show its relation to the country's ex-
ports. In Yugoslavia, the export earnings of a joint venture will
be the primary source of the foreign partner's return on his in-
vestment.
(9) Will the foreign investment be a reinvestment of earnings
in an existing company? If so, while in most cases this may be
favored, there may be other instances where tax penalties will
be applied by the foreign government to such reinvestments, as in
Germany.
(10) Is the Company a listed company? Sometimes restrictions
on new investments and takeover bids, in particular, apply only
when the company to be acquired is listed, or at least publicly held.
Such is the case when local variants of the Securities and Exchange
Commission exist.
SOME GENERAL HURDLES FOR THE U.S. INVESTOR
TO KEEP IN MN
Let us assume that foreign equity ownership is permitted in the
industry involved, although perhaps only on a restricted basis.
What are some of the hurdles which the U.S. investor may face
at the time he makes his investment or when he wishes to remit
to the U.S. his earnings on the investment from his equity contri-
bution itself or from royalties derived from his technical service
or patent contribution to the investment?
Foreign Government Registration Approval Process
It may be necessary for the investment to be properly registered
with and/or approved by the local governmental authorities, and
this normally means a review of the investment by such govern-
mental authorities. In Brazil, an investment contribution in dollars
to a new or existing compdny must be registered to ensure the in-
vestor's ability to remit profits from the investment in dollars at
some later date -after the investment is profitable. The level at
which such profits may be remitted is prescribed by law and ad-
ministrative regulation and varies with the industry involved and
balance of payments difficulties existing during a given period.
In buyouts of donestic companies by foreign companies, or in the
case of the establishment of totally new facilities, many govern-
ments have made it clear that there must be 'appropriate review
and clearance by designated government authorities. In France, for
example, the foreign investor must notify the Ministry of Finance
of his intention to make a foreign direct investment (buyout or new
facility) and the Ministry of Finance must approve the investment.
In Italy, which is one of the freest areas of the world for invest-
ment purposes, there are no controls which apply, but there is a
procedure whereby the investment can be registered and qualified,
subject to appropriate approval, as an "Article I investment"
(Productive Enterprise), under the Investment Law of 1956. This
insures the investor's unlimited right to remit earnings and profits
to his office outside the country, even in troubled times for Italy.
In Belgium, it is possible to obtain a repatriation guarantee for
profits but the right to repatriate dividends and interest will al-
ways depend on the rules in effect at the time the transfer is re-
quested.
One point to be kept in mind is that the host government regis-
tration and/or review and approval of an investment can have an
affirmative value to the foreign investor as evidence of the gov-
ernment's knowledge of, and acquiescence in, the investment, pos-
sibly important for future reference purposes. Here the essential
element to bear in mind is that the subsequent ability to remit div-
idends and fees and to repatriate the original investment in dollars
should be faced at the time of the making of the investment rather
than at some later date when such transfers are needed.
In some countries, such as Romania and Yugoslavia, where joint
ventures are involved, there are further requirements relating to
the registration of the joint venture company with, -and the sub-
mission of its bylaws to, the appropriate governmental agency as
a prerequisite to the operation of the company.
In some situations the concept of registration is met by mere
filing requirements. This was the case, for example, with filings
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relating to acquisitions of a specified size and market impact by
foreign investors with the German Cartel Authority (as required
by the German Cartel Law until its amendment in 1973). How-
ever, in other instances the registration of the investment is a con-
trol point and no foreign investment carries with it full rights (and
obligations) until it has, in fact, been registered by the foreign gov-
ermnent.
Restrictions on Financing
The U.S. investor's foreign venture will require financing, and
there are, in a number of countries, restrictions relating to the
manner of such financing. British authorities do not normally -al-
low a foreign equity investment in the U.K. to be financed from
within the U.K. So, in handling the financing of his investment in
the U.K., the U.S. investor will be confronted with the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce's Foreign Direct Investment Regulations and
also with the British restrictions. In Germany, the U.S. investor's
financing problems will have a reverse twist. Because of Ger-
many's special financial situation and her surplus of foreign ex-
change, new equity investment cannot currently be financed by
having a German subsidiary borrow outside Germany for an ac-
quisition in Germany without incurring a severe penalty. The Ger-
man subsidiary may, for local tax purposes (including the "pool-
ing" of profits and losses for tax purposes of all German opera-
tions), be the chosen instrument to carry out the acquisition, but
it will have to borrow money within Germany at high interest
rates if it is to finance the acquisition with a loam An alternative
route for achieving investment objectives is to make an additional
equity investment in the German subsidiary which is to be the ve-
hicle to carry out the acquisition; however this involves extra tax
costs. Additional financing costs or additional tax costs can at
times hinder the investment.
Antitrust Considerations
There will be foreign antitrust considerations which may restrict
the U.S. investor's foreign investments. Their impact will depend
on (i) the size of the investment, (ii) sales of the acquiree and the
combined market position of the acquiror and acquiree, and (iii)
in certain areas, the total economic clout of the U.S. investor in
terms of financial and technical resources. Here the question of
the appropriate relevant market by which to judge the proposed
investment may be a problem. There may be regional restrictions,
such as those applied by the EEC, or the restrictions might be at
the national level, such as those in effect in Germany. In the case
within the EEC's jurisdiction, if a merger violated either national
rules or Article 86 of the Rome Treaty, it would be prohibited. If
a German merger violated both, it could be pursued by both EEC
and German enforcement agencies. It is also possible that there may
be U.S. antitrust implications in a foreign acquisition where the
acquiring party has significant investments in, or sales to, the U.S.
In addition, antitrust regulations may affect the operation of the
group once the local company is acquired, particularly if a dom-
inant market position is involved.
Personnel Requirements
The U.S. investment overseas probably will require U.S. or third-
country personnel for different types of jobs in the course of op-
eration, particularly during the takeover or start-up period. Re-
strictions on non-nationals which the U.S. investor may employ in
attempting to make the investment a success may, in fact, consti-
tute a restriction on the investment itself. Switzerland has ex-
tremely tight restrictions on the numbers and type of foreign per-
sonnel who can be utilized there. In Yugoslavia, by a statutory
provision, only a Yugoslav national may direct a joint venture en-
terprise. In the province of Ontario, Canada, there is a legislative
requirement, effective in 1973, providing that a majority of the
directors and the -executive committee (if any) of a corporation in-
corporated in Ontario must be "resident Canadians." Mexico is
an area where U.S. personnel, working on U.S.-owned or joint ven-
ture investments, have encountered trouble if they did not have
work permits, which, at times, have not been easy to obtain. Mex-
ico has, in addition, pursued a policy calling for the reduction or
elimination of foreign personnel in Mexican companies. It is true
that within the EEC some relief from local employment restric-
tions has come about, since, in general, nationals of a Member State
of the EEC must be allowed to work in other Member States.
Imports of Equipment
The U.S. investor may need to import either new or used ma-
chinery into the host country. In South America normal duties, or
other import charges, on such equipment may be considerable, even
as much as 100% of the value of the machinery and equipment.
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In addition, there are special requirements applicable to used equip-
ment shipments such as the approval of its value by an Argentine
Consul. Let it suffice to say that this is a point which should be
checked early, particularly to determine whether an exemption
from the duty can be obtained for imports destined for the spe-
cific investment and project. If no waiver can be secured and the
full duty and related charges are to be applied, will the project
still be economically feasible? It is also worth noting that the
waiver of import duties (and perhaps approval of the investment
itself) may be subject to other conditions such as a projected level
of export sales. Is it reasonable to presume the new venture could
produce the required level of export sales?
Investment Insurance
If the investment is in a developing nation, an Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC) insurance policy covering the risk
of war and internal strife, expropriation and currency inconverti-
bility will usually be in order. However, this will require the ap-
proval of a designated agency or agencies in the host country, and
this approval has not been easy to obtain in Argentina and Brazil.
To be -eligible for such insurance, the U.S. investor must inform
OPIC prior to the making of a definite commitment regarding the
investment. It may well be that if host country approval of OPIC
insurance cannot be secured or if the host country will not permit
coverage on all the risks insured by OPIC, then the investment
probably should not be undertaken since the uninsured risks may
realistically be too great.
Foreign Investment Incentives
In a number of areas of the world, tax or financial concessions
may be available to investors who put up new plants in these areas.
Here the chances are that the German or Italian competitors of the
U.S. investor may have obtained such concessions, and, to be com-
petitive, the U.S. investor may need such offers. His inability to
obtain them may constitute a practical restriction. In Italy, tax
concessions covering direct taxes are available for investments in
certain areas .of Northern Italy, and exemptions for both direct
and indirect taxes are available for investment in certain Southern
Italian areas beginning just south of Rome. The granting of such
exemptions may be limited to investments of specified size which
may present problems for the U.S. investor. A prerequisite to the
finalization of exemptions in both areas is, of course, the granting
of specified approvals and clearances by the Italian government.
In connection with tax or financial concessions, the local govern-
ment may impose new restrictions. It may, in effect, enter into a
contract with the investor that includes obligations as to the use
of local labor and obligations to inform workers on business mat-
ters and the like.
Tax treaties serve a vital commercial function in establishing
certainty and moderation, and rules for resolving disputes, with
respect to taxation of income earned in one country by citizens,
residents, or entities of another. The nonexistence or inadequacy
of tax treaties between the U.S. and host countries, which is di-
rected at the avoidance of double taxation may, in fact, constitute
a restriction on U.S. investment activity in the area concerned.
Our tax treaty cooperation is weak or nonexistent with certain
countries of Latin America and Eastern Europe. Recently a treaty
was signed with the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (which
is subject to ratification), which could become a model for the
other countries; it is an encouraging sign.
Very high taxes, such as India's at the 70% level, may constitute
a de facto restriction or deterrent on U.S. investment in the area
concerned unless a U.S. tax credit for the higher taxes can be
made available by averaging these taxes with lower taxes in other
countries. The ability to average credits could be adversely af-
fected by legislation currently being considered by Congress.
Labor Situation
An investor must study the labor market. In Yugoslavia, the
Workers' Council for an industrial unit must approve a joint ven-
ture project involving the unit and a foreign investor. In addition,
in several countries there are statutory provisions on "co-determi-
nation" by workers or their representatives in the running of a
business. Furthermore, if the U.S. investor wishes to take over an
existing facility, his freedom of action with regard to laying off
of workers may, as in the case of the U.K., be restricted by statu-
tory ("redundancy") requirements which, when met, will certainly
be costly. In the case of France or Belgium and a number of other
countries (particularly in Latin America), the investor's freedom
of action with regard to the elimination of agents or distributors
is restricted by statutory requirements calling for substantial in-
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demnities in the case of terminations.
Regional Rules on Investment
The country in which the investment is being considered may
belong to a regional grouping of countries such as the Andean
Group in South America or the European Economic Community in
Europe, and that regional organization's policies may affect the in-
vestment. As indicated previously, the EEC is now discussing a
proposed regulation which would require a notification to the EEC
covering certain buyouts or mergers involving EEC firms. In ad-
dition, in theory at least, EEC firms can establish in other member
countries of the EEC without prior host country clearance-a priv-
ilege that has not been extended to non-EEC investors. However,
France has limited this right of establishment on exchange control
grounds, particularly where the EEC subsidiaries of non-EEC firms
were involved, and has insisted on prior government approval in
such cases.
In the case of the Andean regional restrictions on foreign invest-
ment, the implementation is not uniform from country to country
in the Andean Group, and this warrants the foreign investor's scru-
tiny of the particular country's legislation and practices as well as
the Andean Investment Code. The Andean restrictions cover,
among other things, requirements for registration with, and ap-
proval by, the host governments of new and existing foreign in-
vestments in the Andean countries, and the registration with, and
scrutiny by, host governments of transfers of technology from the
foreign investor to his subsidiary or affiliate in the Andean Group.
In this latter situation payment for his technology may be se-
verely circumscribed at times.
Local Content Requirements
Local content requirements may be a problem, particularly in
certain areas of South America where a high percentage of the
value of the end product-e.g., the car-must be of local content
within a specified period of time. Specifically, in the automotive
industries of Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil, a high percentage of
the value of the parts used in the production of automobiles must
be produced locally.
Other Considerations in PZanning an Investment
As previously indicated, frequently the greater concern of the
investor is not with putting money in the host country, but in ar-
ranging for repatriating dividends and royalties at a future date.
This is vital when dealing in a country where the currency has
not been freely convertible. In addition, it is also important for the
U.S. investor to determine what foreign taxes or other charges will
be applicable to the remittance of funds. In Brazil, profits can only
be remitted after income taxes have been paid, and the remittance
of profits above a specified level may bring about the imposition
of a supplementary tax. If such charges were sufficiently heavy,
they would constitute a de facto restriction on the investor's ability
to invest successfully in a specific country.
An early checkpoint will be the host country's government agen-
cies to which the foreign investor must disclose the details of his
investment. Here the emphasis should be on the fullest possible
disclosure to the agencies involved. If this is not done, the investor
may never be able to regain the confidence so vital to his investment
goals.
There may be unpublished restrictions on foreign investment in
addition to the published restrictions. Mexico was, until recently,
a country where certain restrictions existed in practice and were
generally known, but which had not been published in codified
form. The investor should check with his local attorney and other
sources in the locality to determine whether there are any unpub-
lished government practices, policies or attitudes which restrict for-
eign investors and which might affect the planned investment.
The investor must keep in mind that foreign restrictions on U.S.
investment are continually subject to change by law, decree, or
simply by administrative practice, and that as public pressures and
foreign governments change, so do government policies on foreign
investment. Thus, the investor must have access to information
which will keep him posted on proposed and operative changes in
host government rules and regulations affecting investments.
If the investor is in a minority position in a joint venture, he
should determine what controls he can legally exercise under the
laws of the host country over the actions of the majority partner
and those controls which he thinks are necessary to ensure effective
participation in basic joint venture decisions. At the same time,
he must be mindful to not hamstring the joint venture to such an
extent that it cannot function. Ideally, and to the extent possible,
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the controls he thinks are necessary should be recognized in the
Article of Incorporation. However, in some cases where the Ar-
ticles of Incorporation are reviewed by a government agency as
part of the approval process, some investors have felt it desirable
to place some of the more detailed aspects of these controls in col-
lateral agreements, realizing that there is always the question of
how enforceable such agreements are when they are not recog-
nized in the Articles of Incorporation or supported by statutory
provisions. In any case, an inability on the part of the U.S. investor
in a foreign country to secure enforceable agreements which would
give him the controls he needs over the operation of the investment
is a serious consideration to be weighed by him in determining
whether he wishes to go ahead with the investment.
In addition to ensuring himself an effective voice in key deci-
sions with respect to the operation of the investment, the investor
will want to ensure that in the event of the dissolution of the
joint venture there are no restrictions on his ability to secure the
return of his technology, his capital or his name. He does not
want to be restricted in his recourse only to a forced sale or disposi-
tion of his investment at fire sale prices.
A-N ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF CouTRY Am REGIONAL
RESTRICTIONS ON U.S. INVESTMENT
In a global review of this problem, it seems appropriate to illus-
trate some of the restrictions which the U.S. investor may encoun-
ter in specific geographical areas. Here we are primarily con-
cerned with general restrictions and not those applicable only to
certain sensitive national industries. This list is not all-inclusive;
rather it is intended only to be illustrative of the types of restric-
tions the U.S. investor will encounter in these areas.
Europe
France. A U.S. investor who wants to acquire 20% more of a
French company,3 establish a new operation in France, or expand
a company he already controls, must declare this investment to the
3. In France, however, one gets involved in the approval process auto-
matically upon obtaining 20% or more.
Ministry of Finance and obtain the Ministry's approval.- The
French government has also indicated that clearance from the Min-
ister of Finance should be sought in cases of purchases of less than
20% where other factors such as license agreements or debt financ-
ing might give the U.S. investor the possibility of effective control,
whether or not such control is intended or is, in fact, exercised.5
At the present time acquisitions of French companies by U.S. in-
vestors can be financed in France. Generally loans from foreign
parents to French subsidiaries are considered direct investments6
and require the approval of the French government, while interest
rates which are too high in the government's view may be disal-
lowed for tax purposes. Repatriation of capital must be carried
out through an authorized intermediary, generally a bank, and re-
mittances of less than one million francs are permitted without
prior approval. The required formal approval by the French gov-
ernment for remittances of greater amounts is usually granted
routinely7 License agreements between a foreign parent and a
French subsidiary must be notified to the Ministry of Industrial
Development and Scientific Research within one month after
execution of the agreement.8
As indicated by the foregoing, the problem areas for the foreign
investor in France may be in determining just what constitutes a
foreign direct investment in France, 'and thus, what requires prior
government approval, and the French government's disposition of
proposed foreign buyouts of French companies, which is handled
on a case-by-case basis. In the future, acquisitions or mergers in
France will be subject to the proposed EEC directive covering this
matter.9
Italy. For the U.S. investor who wishes to invest in Italy, there
are no restrictions on buy-ins into Italian companies, or on the
4. Necessity of authorization for direct foreign investment Decree of
November 24, 1968 (1968) J.0. 1021 as modified by Decree of February 22,
1971 (1971) T.O. 144.
5. Definition of "Direct Foreign Investment;" Decree of January 27, 1967
(1967) J.0. 68. Authorization may be required in certain cases of less than
20% stock purchase; Bank of France Note 53 of November 16, 1972, to
approved intermediary banks.
6. Loans from foreign affiliates to French subsidiary are considered
direct investment; Circular of the Ministry of Economy and Finance of
March 21, 1969, concerning loans.
7. When authorization is needed for repatriation of capital; Circular
of the Ministry of Economy and Finance March 21, 1969 concerning repatria-
tion of capital as modified by Circular of September 8, 1970.
8. Notification of license agreements: Decree of May 26, 1970 (1970)
J.0. 441.
9. See p. 28 supra.
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establishment of new enterprises. If the investor wishes to be as-
sured of guaranteed, unlimited remittance of earnings and repatri-
ation of capital at the official exchange rate prevailing at whatever
time payment is being made, he may try to qualify his company
as an Article I company (Productive Enterprise) under Law No. 43
of 1956. To do so he must, for notification and prequalification
purposes, submit an application to the Italian Treasury. However,
authorization of Article I status will not be extended until there
has been verification of the implementation of the investment de-
termined by the Technical Offices of the Ministry of Finance
through visits to the plant, review of accounts, etc. The foreign
investor's status as an Article I company subjects him to some re-
strictions on his ability to borrow in Italy on a medium or long-
term basis.
Borrowings by Italian subsidiaries and affiliates from a U.S. par-
ent and/or affiliate require Treasury and Foreign Trade Ministry
approval if the loans are for five years or less. While payments of
license fees and royalties are not subject to prior clearance, the
bank handling the transaction, acting as an agent of the Exchange
Control Authority, and under its own responsibility, must be sat-
isfied that the amounts remitted are consistent with the provisions
of the contract evidencing the transaction.
Italy is currently the least restrictive major country in the world
from the standpoint of the national regulations which affect the
non-Italian investor, and there are no indications that this will
change. However, acquisitions and mergers in Italy will, for the
first time, be subject to control when the planned EEC regulation
covering prior notification of mergers and acquisitions goes into
effect.
Germany. Until 1973 foreign investment in Germany was rela-
tively free of control, and only a report on an acquisition or merger
had to be filed with the German Cartel Authority if certain size
and market share standards were met or exceeded. Effective June
7, 1973, under the amended Cartel Law,10 notification to the Ger-
man Cartel Authority of an acquisition or merger is required if two
companies are involved whose total turnover, including affiliates,
10. See Gesetz Gegenwettbewerbsbeschraenkugen, as amended, in Scho-
enfolder, Deutsche Gesetze (C.H Beck).
is DM 500 million or more, or whose employees total 10,000 or
more, or where the enterprises involved have 20% of that market
or of any other German market. The notification requirement
is applicable if 25% or 50% or a majority of the shares or sub-
stantially all of the assets of the company are acquired. In addition,
where a dominant position is created or increased, acquisitions or
mergers are prohibited in the absence of special justifying circum-
stances. A dominant position is presumed if (A) an enterprise has
a market share of more than 33-1/3% and did not have less than DM
250 million turnover, or (B) the acquisition or merger is in an
oligopolistic industry where three or less enterprises have more
than 50%, or five or less enterprises have more than 66-2/3% of the
market, and the enterprises involved did not individually have less
than DM 100 million turnover. A possible justification for acqui-
sitions or mergers in cases where dominant positions are involved
might be that the acquisitions or mergers improve competitive
conditions, and this improvement outweighs disadvantages for com-
petition, or that the merger was in the public interest. There is
an exemption from possible Federal Cartel Authority intervention
for mergers or acquisitions where the acquiree had less than DM
50 million in turnover. All mergers involving two companies with
more than DM 1 billion each require prior Federal Cartel Author-
ity approval.
For exchange control purposes, prior approval is required for
acquisitions of stock corporations (AGs), although no prior ap-
proval is required in the case of acquisition of KGs or GmbHs.
With regard to financing acquisitions or operations in Germany,
the government is attempting to dampen the flow of money into
Germany, and currently it is not possible, without penalty, for the
German subsidiary of a U.S. company to borrow money outside
Germany to finance an acquisition in Germany.1 1 Where such bor-
rowing is done, the German subsidiary must make a cash deposit of
a percentage (currently 50%) of the borrowing in an interest-free
account with the German Federal Bank. Although there is this
pressure for financing acquisitions within Germany with German
funds and at an increased interest cost, it should be noted that
'acquisitions can still be financed from outside Germany without a
cash deposit as, for example, when a U.S. company purchases the
shares of a GmbH, and borrows the money outside Germany to
finance the acquisition.
There is no German requirement that license agreements be-
ll. See Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz, as amended, in Schoenbelden, Deut-
sche Gesetz (C.H. Beck).
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tween U.S. parents and German subsidiaries and affiliates be regis-
tered for German purposes, and royalties may be remitted freely.
As indicated above, Germany has been tightening exchange con-
trols (admittedly for domestic and international monetary reasons)
'and has enacted a tough anti-merger law. Germany will also be
subject to the planned EEC Regulation covering mergers and ac-
quisitions. If a proposed merger or acquisition in Germany vio-
lates either the German rules or the EEC rules, it would be pro-
hibited, and if it violated both, the infraction could be pursued
under either.
United Kingdom. The organization of a new company and an
offer for the stock of an existing company by a U.S. firm both re-
quire the consent of the Exchange Control Office at the Bank of
England. In reviewing the transaction, the Bank of England will
normally require that the necessary financing comes from outside
the U.K., and there are de facto penalties12 for the use of U.S. com-
pany stock for a U.K. acquisition. An exception to the require-
ment of outside financing is the establishment of a new plant in a
"development area", which can normally be financed within the
U.K. Acquisition of British companies by U.S. firms above the
five million pounds level, or where 33-1/3% 13 or more of the rele-
rant U.K. market is involved, is subject to review by the Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry and may be referred to the Monopolies
Commission.' 4 There are rules of conduct established by the Gov-
ernor of the Bank of England laid down by the City Working Party
in a document entitled "The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers,"
which are applicable to U.K. takeovers and mergers. These rules
apply primarily to firms whose stock is registered on the London
Stock Exchange, and are administered by the Panel on Take-overs
and Mergers.
Loans from U.S. firms to their U.K. subsidiaries or affiliates all
12. Reference is made to the so-called "switch and surrender operation"
involving the acquisition and surrender of investment currency. Specifi-
cally a United Kingdom resident acquiring U.S. stock has to pay a dollar
premium. When he disposes of this stock he receives the benefit of
whatever the dollar premium is at that date but he has to surrender a
percentage thereof to the Government.
13. There is currently legislation before Parliament which proposed to
reduce this percentage figure to 25%.
14. Monopolies and Mergers Act, c.6.
require U.K. Exchange Control approval. Profit transfers from
U.K. subsidiaries and affiliates to the U.S. parent require Bank of
England consent. Seldom are great difficulties encountered in such
transfers. Capital may be repatriated without difficulty from the
U.K. to the U.S. provided its entrance into the U.K. was properly
approved. Finally, payment of license fees and royalties requires
Bank of England approval which, in the absence of special circum-
stances, should not present a problem.
While Exchange controls in the U.K. are posing less and less of
a problem with the recent strength of the pound, there is currently
government-proposed legislation before Parliament, which would
require that any acquisition or merger involving at least 25% of the
relevant market be submitted to the Department of Trade and In-
dustry for review and possible referral to the Monopolies Commis-
sion. In addition, the planned EEC Directive on acquisitions and
mergers will affect acquisitions and mergers by U.S. firms in the
U.K.'5
Spain. In most industries, a foreign investor who acquires, ei-
ther directly or indirectly, 50% or less of the capital of a Spanish
company need merely file notice of such acquisition with the Span-
ish government. Specific approval is required for investments of
more than 50% in key industries, and such approval is not easy to
obtain in the absence of special circumstances. 16 Loans to Spanish
affiliates 'and subsidiaries from outside Spain by foreign investors
must be registered and authorized -by IEME (The Foreign Ex-
change Institute), not only to insure repatriation of the loan prin-
cipal and interest, but mainly to prevent the Spanish affiliates and
subsidiaries from being held criminally responsible as a matter
of penal law.17 The Spanish government prohibits or restricts (de-
pending on the percentage of ownership) license fee payments by
Spanish subsidiaries or affiliates to foreign firms owning an inter-
est in the Spanish firms. Conceptually, the Spanish government
maintains that there is a "oneness" between parent and subsidiary
as the percentage of ownership grows larger, and does not recognize
the logic of compensating transfers of technology within a corpo-
rate group whose ownership is all the same. Thus, the current
15. See p. 28 supra, for a discussion of this Directive which is still in
the drafting stage.
16. For general comments re Foreign Investment in Spain see Law of
July 27, 1959, Order of March 15, 1962, Decree of May 17, 1962, and Decree
of April 18, 1963, all of which are concerning Foreign Investment in Spain.
17. For comments re Loans to Spanish Subsidiaries and Affiliates see
Monetary Crimes Act (1938) and IEMVE's Circular No. 249 (August 10,
1968).
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problem areas for the foreign investor in Spain are those of obtain-
ing (1) more than a 50% equity participation, and (2) adequate
compensation for technology transfers where he has a substantial
equity participation.
Switzerland. The establishment of a new business or the buy-in
by a foreign investor of a Swiss company is comparatively easy, al-
though very little of this type of investment has taken place be-
cause of the comparatively small Swiss market, Switzerland's non-
alignment with trading blocs, and because of problems in obtaining
work permits for non-Swiss personnel. The establishment of a new
business or the buy-in requires the authorization of the Swiss
National Bank.18 Transfers of profits and repatriation of capital
from Switzerland are relatively free. Switzerland currently has
severe exchange control measures covering the entrance of funds
into Switzerland, but these measures apply primarily to portfolio-
type investments and investments in real estate.19
In Switzerland, the entrance of foreign personnel is severely re-
stricted.20 A foreign investor in Switzerland may find himself
severely circumscribed, 'and faced with an investment that he can-
not adequately operate with personnel from outside Switzerland,
because he just cannot obtain Swiss work permits. This has, in
fact, deterred many prospective investors in Switzerland. Further-
more, there are currently no indications that the work permit situ-
ation for foreign personnel in Switzerland will ease.
Latin America
Mexico. Mexico enacted a new law for the promotion of Mexican
investment and the regulation of foreign investment, which be-
came effective May 8, 1973.21 It defines foreign investment essen-
tially as that of any foreign individual, company or enterprise,
or of a Mexican company having majority foreign capital, or where
18. See Federal Decree of June 26, 1972.
19. See Federal Act of October 8, 1971 concerning the Defense of Cur-
rency. See also Federal Decree of June 26, 1972 concerning the Prohibition
Against Putting Monies in Swiss Real Estate.
20. The legal basis is the Federal Law of March 26, 1931 concerning
the Residence and Establishment of Foreigners; and the Decree of the
Federal government of April 21, 1972, limiting the number of foreigners
who exercise a lucrative activity.
21. See publication in Official Federal Daily Gazette, March 9, 1973.
foreigners have control over management of the company. Pre-
vious legislative and administrative requirements regarding spe-
cific percentages of foreign capital permitted in various Mexican
industries continue in effect. Further, the new law sets forth a
general rule limiting foreign investment to a maximum of 49%
ownership, and prohibits foreign control of management unless a
special ruling from the National Commission on Foreign Invest-
ment, established by the new law, is obtained, allowing a greater
percentage. Criteria for such an exception are included in the law.
A Registry of Foreign Investment is created requiring registra-
tion within 180 days of foreign investments as defined above (i.e.,
of Mexican companies in which foreign capital participates), of
trusts relating to real estate in prohibited zones where foreigners
are beneficiaries, of shares owned by foreigners or given in guar-
antee to foreigners. Dividends cannot be paid if the investment is
not registered. Bearer shares must be changed to registered shares
for such registration purposes.
While existing companies are not affected by the new statutory
limits on foreign investment, the new law gives the Commission
the power inter alia to resolve questions relating to the investment
of foreign capital in established companies, in companies to be es-
tablished, or in new establishments, and the participation of for-
eign investment in new fields of economic activity or new products.
No specific regulations, interpretations or definitions are yet avail-
able, nor is it clear to what extent capital increases are included
within these powers of the Commission. A permit is required for
any foreign investor to acquire, in one or a series of acts, 25% or
more of the capital or 49% of the fixed assets of any company.
Rental of an establishment, or of assets essential to the operation of
a company, is considered as an acquisition of assets.
Penalties are provided for actions which may be taken to give
the appearance of compliance, and for noncompliance with provi-
sions of the law applicable to directors and officers. Any act con-
trary to provisions of the law is null and void.
On December 30, 1972, the Law on Transfers of Technology and
the Use and Exploitation of Patents and Trademarks was pub-
lished in the Federal Official Daily Gazette, to become effective Jan-
uary 30, 1973.22 This law requires the registration with the Tech-
nology Registry of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce of all
agreements of the genre indicated, as well as agreements for serv-
22. See publication in Official Federal Daily Gazette, December 30,
1972.
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ices relating to the administration and operation of companies in
Mexico within 60 days of execution. Certain exclusions are estab-
lished, such as emergency situations, initial operational arrange-
ments for machinery and equipment, and border program opera-
tions. No distinction is made between contracts involving only
Mexicans and those involving foreigners. Certain types of con-
sultation agreements also could be subject to registration.
To be registrable, an agreement must satisfy certain require-
ments of which the following are the most important: 1) the
agreement cannot involve technology already available in the coun-
try; 2) payments under the agreement should not create an un-
reasonable and unjustified burden on the economy; 3) the agree-
ment must not contain a restriction on exports contrary to the
interests of Mexico; an obligatory grantback clause, a provision
requiring the exclusive sale of the licensed product to the grantor
of the technology, a provision requiring the grantor of the tech-
nology to be the exclusive sales agent in Mexico for such products,
a provision fixing limits on production, a provision fixing sale or
resale prices of the licensed products for domestic consumption or
exportation, or clauses making foreign law applicable or requiring
submission of disputes under the agreements to foreign courts.
An existing agreement could be simply presented to the Tech-
nology Registry of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce as exe-
cuted before June 25, 1973. However, the agreement must be reg-
istered within two years after January 30, 1973, the effective date
of law, and at that time it must comply with the requirements de-
scribed above. Existing contracts not presented and new con-
tracts not registered shall be considered "nonexistent," and any
payments thereunder will not be deductible for tax purposes.
There have always been restrictions in Mexico by way of import
permit requirements and customs duties on imports of equipment,
parts and materials which, in the past (especially when local op-
position in an industry sector existed), have made implementation
of investment projects by foreigners difficult. Foreign investors
generally have found that these problems are easier to overcome
when they have joint ventures with Mexican interests and espe-
cially when the local joint venture partner holds a substantial or a
majority interest.
The statutory codification of policies covering foreign invest-
ment is good in part because it clarifies matters. However, the
new Foreign Investment Law and the new Law covering trans-
fers of technology to Mexico almost inevitably mean that an ad-
ministrative rigidity will be created which did not exist before,
and that additional time and expense will be incurred by the for-
eign investor in meeting these new requirements.
Brazil. Foreign investment and reinvestment in Brazil must be
registered with the Central Bank within 30 days of entering Brazil
or incorporation into capital. Remittance of profits is governed by
the Remittance of Profits Law of 1962, as amended. A prerequi-
site to the remittance of profits is registration of the capital invest-
ment with the Central Bank and payment of income tax on
such profits. Remittance in excess of 12% per year of invested
capital, based on a three-year average, entails a higher withhold-
ing tax than the normal 25%. In addition, remittance of profits on
registered investment may be limited during times of emergency to
10% annually where production of normal non-luxury items is
involved.
Remittance of principal and interest payments on foreign loans
is subject to prior registration of the loan with the Central Bank,
which may disallow interest rates in excess of those prevailing in
the lending country. At this time foreign loans are acceptable for
a minimum eight-year period, without need for any blocked de-
posit.
Royalty payments from a Brazilian subsidiary to its U.S. parent
are not a deductible item, and patent and trademark royalty remit-
tance is prohibited. Technical assistance fees are allowed, but may
not exceed 5% of net sales, and the rendering of the assistance
must be documented. Registration of Technical Assistance Agree-
ments is subject to prior review by the National Institute for Tech-
nical Property as to technical aspects. 23  Technical Assistance
Agreements also must be registered with the Central Bank as
a prerequisite for remittances, and such registration is normally
valid for only five years.24
There has been considerable speculation in Brazil recently con-
cerning a possible decree which would require prior government
approval of mergers and acquisitions involving Brazilian and for-
23. See Coleso das Leis, Atos do Poder Legislativo, Law 5,772 of De-
cember 21, 1971.
24. See Law 4,131 of September 3, 1962 as amended by Law 4,390 of
August 29, 1964, and consolidated by Decree 55,762 of February 17, 1965
(Colecao (legis.)).
[voL. 11: 27, 1973] Restrictions on U.S. Investments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
eign firms. As this article is written, prior government approval
is required only in the case of the purchase of Brazilian companies
which have received tax incentives under the condition that no
change in equity control would occur without securing prior gov-
ernmental approval. In view of the rapid growth of foreign in-
vestment in Brazil, its advancing industrial capabilities, and devel-
opments elsewhere on the continent it seems likely that Brazilian
government intervention in such matters will grow rather than
recede. Additionally, controls over payments by Brazilian firms
to their foreign parents probably will remain a difficult area both
from a remittance and a tax standpoint.
Andean Common Market. The Andean Common Market 25 is a
group of Latin American countries largely in the Andean Moun-
tain area and includes Bolivia, Peru, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and
Venezuela. These countries have agreed on certain principles, the
Andean Investment Code, which severely restrict the scope of new
foreign investment.
Enterprises are classified as National Enterprises (more than
80% owned or controlled by local investors); Mixed Enterprises
(51-80% owned or controlled by local investors); and Foreign
Enterprises (less than 51% owned or controlled by local inves-
tors). Certain key industries are barred to Foreign Enterprises
and foreign investors.
All new and existing foreign investment and reinvestment must
be registered with and approved by the host governments.2 6 En-
terprises which do not reduce foreign investment to minority par-
ticipation within a fixed period of time are to be denied the re-
duced tariffs offered to imports from other members of the An-
dean Common Market. There are also restrictions with respect to
the acquisition by foreigners of equity interests from local inves-
tors, the acquisition of newly issued capital of National and Mixed
Enterprises, particularly when the character of -the Enterprise is
changed, and the sale by a foreign investor of an equity interest.
Such a sale must be made to a local investor if the foreign investor
is to have remittance rights. In addition, profits remitted annu-
25. Decision 24 of the Cartagena Agreement (Andean Common Market).
26. Under the Andean Code, the host governments may waive the re-
quirement for host government authorization and registration of reinvest-
ments of up to 5% of annual net profits.
ally cannot exceed 14% of invested capital (including reinvest-
ments) without special approval. Finally, transfers of technology
to licensees within the Andean Group by foreign investor licensors
are to be registered and will be closely scrutinized from the stand-
point of the royalty level involved, and other provisions, such as
export restrictions. There is a complete prohibition on the pay-
ment of royalties by an Andean "Foreign Enterprise" to its U.S.
parent.
In assessing the effect of the foreign investment principles
adopted by the Andean Group, it should be kept in mind that their
detailed implementation varies among the member countries. It
also should be noted that the principles must be implemented
through the legislature of the individual member country-and it
goes without saying that this implementation can and has varied.
The U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) has
suspended its financial and political risk investment insurance pro-
gram in some Andean countries pending receipt of certain inter-
pretations of the Andean Investment Code. Certainly the trend in
this region is toward greater restrictions on foreign investment.
The means of enforcement are exchange controls in most Andean
countries, an operating license requirement in others, and the
nonavailability to Foreign Enterprises of tariff concessions on their
exports to other Andean Group members.
Argentina. In late 1971, the Argentine government enacted a
new Foreign Investment Law under which new investments must
be registered and approved in order to receive the benefits of the
law-principally the guarantee of remittability of profits and the
right to repatriate capital and reinvested profits. 21
Law 18,875, known as the "Promotion of Local Industry Law,"
distinguishes between local companies of internal capital and local
companies of external capital. Local companies of internal capital
must have the following qualifications:
(1) The company must be organized in accordance with Argen-
tine law, and the domicile and place of business must be Argen-
tina;
(2) At least 80% of the members of the Board of Directors and
key personnel must be domiciled in Argentina;
(3) The company must have a Board of Directors and Manage-
ment not having any direct or indirect dependency upon private or
public foreign entities;
27. Foreign Investment Law (1971) No. 19,151.
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(4) At least 51% of the company's capital and votes must be-
long to persons whose real "domicile" is in Argentina.
Companies not meeting the above qualifications are considered
companies of external capital or "foreign" companies. Local corn-
panies of internal capital are eligible for special financial assist-
ance and preference in government purchasing. Companies with
a majority of foreign capital are restricted to short-term or evolu-
tion credit up to a maximum of 50% of registered capital plus ac-
cumulated reserves (but this restriction does not apply to exports).
There are also restrictions on the introduction of new products.
In the automotive parts industry, for example, foreign companies
are allowed to produce new parts only if there are no local pro-
ducers who can do so. 28
There are currently no restrictions regarding takeovers of Ar-
gentine firms by foreign firms, however, the Argentine govern-
ment has announced that it is contemplating such legislation. In
addition, there are indications that Argentina may completely re-
vise its current legislation regarding foreign investments, along
the lines of the Andean Investment Code.
Argentina has not approved OPIC investment insurance against
expropriation. Thus the U.S. investor in Argentina cannot cur-
rently insure his new investments in Argentina with OPIC against
the risk of expropriation.
Profit remittance in the form of dividends from an Argentine
subsidiary to a U.S. parent, may presently be done only by pur-
chasing Argentine government bonds, which then may be sold by
the parent in the U.S. at a discount.
Under a 1971 law, new and existing license agreements between
a U.S. parent and its subsidiary or affiliate in Argentina must be
registered with the government. Registration is a prerequisite to
the payment of royalties which may be denied if the agreement
does not meet Argentine government requirements.29
In summary, Argentina has had a policy of encouraging local
participation with foreign investors. This policy is reflected in
matters such as restrictions on local borrowings and restrictions
28. Foreign Investment Laws (1971) No. 18,875 and No. 19,135.
29. Foreign Investment Law (1971) No. 19,231.
with regard to production in certain key industries. It may be
assumed that this policy will be carried further under the current
administration.
Far East
Japan. The foreign investment authorities must review and ap-
prove all foreign equity investment, whether on a buy-in basis or
upon the establishment of a new company.3 0 Depending on the
industry and the percentage of foreign ownership sought, equity
investment will either be validated "automatically," or be sub-
jected to further review.
Where there is a buy-in of an existing company in a fully lib-
eralized industry, if the consent of the company has been obtained,
the acquiring foreign investor may receive automatic validation
without limitation on the amount of ownership.31 This consent
must be given by the management of the company being acquired.
In the absence of such consent, automatic validation will be ac-
corded only if a single foreign investor's shareholding is less than
10% and the aggregate number of shares held by all foreign inves-
tors is less than 25%. In certain specified industries, such as bank-
ing and public utilities, the acceptable percentage is reduced to
15% of the total outstanding shares of the company.32 In 17 in-
dustries, such as computers, integrated circuits and real estate, ma-
jority foreign ownership will be validated automatically only after
specified dates which have been fixed for each of these 17 indus-
tries, ranging from August 4, 1974 to April 30, 1976. 33
In five natural resource and other industries, majority foreign
ownership will not be validated automatically in the foreseeable
future. In these industries, foreign equity participation, whether
by formation of a new company or on a buy-in basis, will be vali-
dated automatically only up to 10% for a single foreign investor
and, in one case only up to an aggregate of 15%; in other cases,
foreign investors may hold up to an aggregate of 257.34
All license agreements between a foreign investor and his Japan-
ese licensee affiliate or subsidiary must be submitted to the gov-
30. Law of May 10, 1950, Concerning Foreign Investment, No. 163, Art.
11.
31. Cabinet Order concerning exceptions to standard for validation
based on the provisions of the Law Concerning Foreign Investment-Cabi-
net Order No. 221, July 1, 1952; concerning liberalization of inward direct
investment, Resolution adopted by Cabinet, April 27, 1973.
32. Cabinet Resolution, April 27, 1973.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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ernment, and formal validation by the foreign investment authori-
ties is required if the term of the license agreement is to exceed
one year.35 In the area of electronic computers, technological as-
sistance is subject to close scrutiny by the foreign investment au-
thorities.36
Loans between Japanese firms and foreign parents and/or affil-
iates must receive a foreign exchange license.37 Dividends may be
remitted and invested capital may be repatriated freely if valida-
tion of investment is obtained.38
Japan has indicated that, with the 1973 liberalization of foreign
investment in Japan, it is complying with the OECD (Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development) Code.39 Thus it
would appear that Japan's approach with respect to foreign invest-
ment will be more liberal. However, it will only be as actual eases
are handled that we can judge what the practical outcome of the
new policy will be.
Taiwan. At the time an investment is made, the foreign inves-
tor must obtain approval from the Ministry of Economic Affairs
so that he can later freely remit earnings and/or repatriate capi-
tal.40 When this is done, repatriation of capital on approved in-
vestments can be made at the rate of 15% annually of the invest-
ment approved, starting the third year after the project begins op-
erations.
In the event that the foreign investor wishes to transfer his
shares to another foreign national, the Ministry of Economic Al-
35. Law of May 10, 1950, Concerning Foreign Investment, No. 163,
Art. 10.
36. Joint Ministerial Ordinance determining the scope of business to be
entrusted to the Bank of Japan by virtue of the provisions of the Law
Concerning Foreign Investment-Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Inter-
national Trade and Industry, Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of
Postal Affairs, Ministry of Construction, Joint Ministerial Ordinance,
June 30, 1967.
37. Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law (1963) Art. 30:
Ministerial Ordinance Concerning Control of Invisible Transactions-MOF
Ordinance No. 58, November 2, 1963.
38. Law of May 10, 1950, Concerning Foreign Investment, Arts. 15-2 and
15-3, Table 22 to MOF Ordinance Concerning Control of Invisible Transac-
tions.
39. See p. 63 infra.
40. See Chinese Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals, as
amended December 14, 1969.
fairs must, in practice, approve such a transfer. Loans from for-
eign parenta to Taiwan subsidiaries or affiliates are subject to
prior approval by the Central Bank of Taiwan and, with this ap-
proval, remittance of principal and interest may be made freely.
Local content requirements have been established for production
in many industries, and imports of capital equipment are tightly
controlled. License agreements calling for remittance of royalties
from Taiwan firms to U.S. parents or affiliates are subject to
prior governmental approval.41
Taiwan is becoming more selective with respect to new foreign
investment and is accepting such investment in certain types of in-
dustry while not accepting it in others. Taiwan's current restric-
tions on such investment are, however, moderate.
Korea. All foreign investment, whether by subscription to new
shares of a company to be established or to the shares of an exist-
ing company, requires authorization from the Minister of the Eco-
nomic Planning Board under Article 6 of the Foreign Capital
Inducement Law (hereinafter called FCIL).42 However, invest-
ment through buying -already issued and outstanding shares of a
company is not permitted under FCIL. Within the Korean gov-
ernment, requests for the authorization provided for in Article 6
are reviewed by the Foreign Capital Inducement Deliberation
Committee. Article 4 of FCIL provides that the Minister of the
Economic Planning Board shall, in granting such authorization or
approvals, give priority to those projects which will "greatly" con-
tribute to the improvement of the nation's balance of payments
position and to joint ventures with local capital participation, and
Article 6 of FCIL also provides that the authorization referred to
above can be issued with certain conditions, such as adjustment of
the proportion of shares of stock between Korean nationals and
foreign nationals. An investment ratio of 50-to-50 between the
foreign investor and the Korean partner is strongly recommended
by the government. If an investment is wholly foreign-owned, it
is government policy to require this company to export its total
production abroad.
All license agreements must be approved by the Minister of the
Economic Planning Board under Article 19 of FCIL. Once a
license is approved, remittance of royalties and fees is guaranteed
under Article 20 of FCIL. Remittance of profits is guaranteed by
Article 11 of FCIL, but approval therefor must be obtained from
41. See Chinese Statute for Technical Cooperation, a amended May 29,
1966.
42. Law No. 1802, as amended.
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the Ministry of Finance before each remittance, as required by
Article 7 of the Enforcement Decree of FCIL. Reinvestment of
profits up to the amount of the original investment is permitted
without approval, but such investment must be reported for ac-
ceptance to the Minister of the Economic Planning Board under
Article 7 of FCIL. Repatriation of capital after two years of op-
eration at the rate of 20% per annum is guaranteed by Article 12
of FCIL.
To sum up, joint ventures are the order of the day in Korea and
will continue to be for most U.S. investors in the foreseeable fu-
ture. They provide a means of leveraging the investment and lim-
iting risks and, as indicated above, the Korean government
strongly favors them as a vehicle for foreign investment.
Australia. Any direct acquisition of stock in an Australian com-
pany by a foreign investor is subject to Reserve Bank approval
under Australian foreign exchange regulations.43 The practice of
the Reserve Bank is to make the approval subject to the consent of
the Committee on Foreign Takeovers established pursuant to the
Companies (Foreign Takeovers) Act of 1972. While the provisions
of this Act do not specifically require the parties to obtain ap-
proval, they do appear to give the government the authority to
seek a divesting order if an acquisition is made which could be
considered contrary to the national interest. The Act does not
define what is meant by "national interest. '44
The purchase of assets as distinct from the purchase of shares
is not covered by the Companies (Foreign Takeovers) Act of 1972,
although there have been indications that the law will be amended
to cover purchases of assets and other areas of interest. Pres-
ently, some leeway is permitted on sales of interests in Australian
companies from one foreign owner to another, and also where the
assets taken over amount to less than $1 million and no important
national interest considerations are raised.45
Any borrowings from overseas to finance Australian acquisi-
43. Banking (Foreign Exchange) Regulations Act (Aust.).
44. Companies (Foreign Takeovers) Act of 1972 (Aust.). This will prob-
ably be rewritten in 1973 to broaden its application.
45. See former Prime Minister's Statement on Overseas Investment,
dated September 26, 1972, for criteria which Committee on Foreign Take-
overs is following.
tions require Reserve Bank approval and are subject to a compul-
sory interest-free deposit requirement if the loans are in excess of
$100,000 within a 12-nonth period.40 There are also restrictions on
the length of such loans.
Australia is becoming more restrictive toward U.S. corporate in-
vestors. The new takeovers legislation, which requires prior re-
view by the Australian government of most takeovers and acqui-
sitions of Australian firms by foreign firms, may be a prelude to
further restrictions.
Eastern Europe
Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia now permits joint ventures between
Yugoslav entities and foreign firms in which the foreign investor
has up to a 49% interest.Y Foreign participation requires the estab-
lishment of a joint stock company whose Articles must be ap-
proved by the Workers' Council of the entity involved and by the
Yugoslav government (Federal Secretariat for Economics). The
Yugoslav partner must take the lead in obtaining these approvals,
since the foreign partner cannot. Essentially, the foreign partner
has no right to form a new enterprise in Yugoslavia and joint ven-
tures to date have involved existing entities or new entities formed
by the Yugoslav partner.
In the Yugoslav joint venture, the foreign equity investor's rem-
edies are limited to recourse against his Yugoslav partner and,
conceptually, he has no direct equity rights in the investment it-
self.
The U.S. investor's investment may not be less than 1-1/2 million
dinars nor for less than five years, and, to date, joint venture con-
tracts registered have not been for more than 15 years. If the joint
venture contract so provides, the foreign partner is permitted to
withdraw part of his investment during the term of the contract.
Upon termination of the contract, he may repatriate the full
amount of his original investment. A foreign partner may sell his
participation in the joint venture to another company but he must
offer it first to his Yugoslav partner. Remittance of profits to the
46. Statements to Prime Minister Whitlam and Reserve Bank of Austra-
lia, dated December 23, 1972, related to compulsory deposit procedure on
foreign borrowings.
47. See Foreign Investments in Yugoslavia-legal problems; Yugoslavia
Chamber of Economy Institute of Comparative Law, Belgrade 1972; see
also pamphlet describing International Investment Corporation for Yugo-
slavia (IICY) whose function is to help foreign investors desiring to do
business in Yugoslavia.
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foreign partner is dependent upon foreign exchange availabilities
of the joint venture and of the Yugoslav partner.
The management of the joint venture must be through a busi-
ness board on which the Workers' Council and foreign investor
have equal representation. A unanimous vote can be required on
all important decisions. The managing director must be a Yugo-
slav.
License agreements between foreign investor licensors and their
Yugoslav affiliate licensees are subject to prior Yugoslav govern-
ment approval.
Yugoslavia continues its cautious moves toward liberalization,
particularly for export-oriented joint ventures. It is interesting to
note that in 1973 OPIC insurance was made available for invest-
ments in Yugoslavia.
Romania. In late 1972, Romania enacted legislation which per-
mits joint ventures between Romanian firms and foreign investors
provided, however, that a majority of the ownership (at least
51%) is Romanian.48  Prior governmental approval of the Coun-
cil of Ministers of State is a prerequisite to the establishment of
joint ventures, and the Romanian partner is charged with inform-
ing the appropriate government ministries regarding the establish-
ment of such ventures.
It may be agreed between the parties that the foreign partner
will have veto rights over actions to be taken by the partnership
and foreign personnel may hold management positions in the joint
venture.
Remittance of profits from the joint venture to the foreign part-
ner is to be primarily from the joint venture's holdings of foreign
currency which presumably will be generated by export sales.
Prior Romanian government approval is a prerequisite to the es-
tablishment and implementation of license agreements between
foreign investor licensors and Romanian affiliate licensees.
Romania's joint venture program, put into effect in November,
1972, would appear to be a good start in the right direction, but we
48. Decree of November 2, 1972 concerning the Socialist Republic of
Romania; see also Directives of the Tenth Congress of the Roumanian
Communist Party, Meridiane Publishing House (1969).
do not yet have enough working experience with it to adequately
judge what its impact will be. It is noteworthy in this connection
that Communist Party planning directives indicate a firm national
commitment to the program.
So.TE GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
For the most part, it can be said that legal restrictions applicable
to foreign investment in most countries affect equally both U.S.
investors and investors from other countries. Currently there are
comparatively few foreign investment restrictions which discrimi-
nate against U.S. investment, but this may change in the future
in countries within certain regional groupings such as the EEC and
the Andean Group. Theoretically, under EEC rules a firm incor-
porated in one Member State can establish itself without diffi-
culty in 'any other Member State, although the French have in-
sisted that they wish to limit this right of establishment in France,
particularly as asserted by companies incorporated in other EEC
countries that are controlled by non-EEC groups.
In the nature of things, the proposed E.C. regulation instituting a
prior notice requirement for mergers and acquisitions involving
companies above a certain sales volume will affect more American
companies than others, because of their size, except when they are
acquiring relatively small companies. This would certainly be a
de facto restriction on U.S. investment in the EEC if put into ef-
fect as currently contemplated. This will also be true of the new
German legislation on mergers where the applicability of the leg-
islation will depend on the size of the firms involved. What this
means, of course, is that merger activities by U.S. firms will be
closely scrutinized because the worldwide sales of the U.S. firms
will bring them within the sales volume levels set forth in the
statute where scrutiny and/or approval of the German government
authorities is required as a condition to a merger going into 'effect.
In the Andean area, preference is given to investors located in
the Andean countries, but it is too early to judge the full impact of
this policy at this time. Certainly, locally-owned firms have the
advantage of reduced tariffs vis-a-vis foreign-controlled firms
when they trade within the Andean bloc. Other Andean Group
practices may pose problems for the U.S. investor who wishes to
enter this growing market of 66 million people.
Limitations on the right of recourse by foreign investors to the
courts of the country where an investment has been made may
constitute another de facto restriction on the investment. Thus, at
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the outset, it may be desirable for the foreign investor to deter-
mine what his legal remedies may be in the event of the breach of
an agreement by his joint venture partner, if he has one, 'and how
he can enforce his remedies. In some cases disputes are handled
by resort to arbitration by virtue of prior agreement or as diffi-
culties arise, but if a foreign government is involved, will it subject
itself to arbitration in a neutral forum and, if so, under what con-
ditions? Recently there has been an increasing willingness on the
part of the Eastern European governments to submit disputes with
foreign investors and other foreign businessmen to arbitration un-
der the Arbitration Rules of the Economic Commission for Europe
or at least in one instance to the rules of the International Cham-
ber of Commerce. This development is certainly promising.
As regards country restrictions on inflows of investment and
other capital, what about the application of the OECD Code to the
situation in which the U.S. investor finds himself in many coun-
tries? A number of the nations whose laws are discussed above
are members of the OECD (Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development). The OECD Code of Liberalization of Cap-
ital Movements (June 1965) calls upon members to progressively
abolish restrictions on international capital movements, but there
are no legal teeth in the Code. While all members, including the
U.S., have entered some reservations to the Code of Liberalization
of Capital Movements, Japan, when it joined the OECD, entered a
large number of reservations particularly for an industrial nation.
The Japanese government cited the Code when announcing the
1973 liberalization of restrictions on incoming foreign investment,
but it cannot be assumed that this was actually the dominant reason
for Japan's new approach towards foreign investment. The OECD
Code represents, at minimum, a "moral" obligation to members
to liberalize movements of capital internationally, while recognizing
that sovereign states must reserve to themselves some leeway to
act unilaterally in meeting the requirements of sensitive industries.
Here it should be kept in mind that the Codes are not treaties, but
they prescribe a standard on which practices could be attacked.
While perhaps these Codes have not afforded significant protection
to the U.S. investor in OECD countries against investment restric-
tions per se, their existence, and the periodic reviews of members'
restrictions contrary to the Codes, probably has acted as a deterrent
to some national actions which might have been harmful to the
international economic order.
Theoretically, the U.S. investor who wishes to take advantage
of the United States' Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Nav-
igation with foreign governments in order to protest restrictions
on the right of establishment, should be free to do so through his
government. This would mean, for example, that under the 1960
U.S.-France Convention of Establishment49 (which follows the
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation bilateral Treaty between
these countries), he could protest to the U.S. government against
the French government's restrictions on his right to establish a
business in France by buying, in part or in whole, a French com-
pany or starting a business de novo. The Convention provides that
nationals of either party are to be accorded "national" treatment
in the other's territory. In Treaty terminology this means that U.S.
companies desiring to establish and conduct businesses in France
are to have the same rights and standing as French companies in
France, and the same equal standing is to be accorded to French-
owned firms which are established in the U.S. vis-a-vis U.S. firms.
However, while this "right" may exist, the investor probably will
not want to force the issue through his government for fear of
host government reprisals 0 and possible loss of public esteem in
the host country. It also may be noted that our government may
not wish to raise the matter too forcefully, depending on political
and economic relationships with the host country. Let it suffice to
say that the concept of national treatment as set forth in most of
these bilateral treaties has not been a fully effective device for the
protection of investors.
Another difficulty faced by U.S. investors is the fact that many
governments adopt the tactic of simply delaying action indefi-
nitely on an investment application when they do not favor the
application, or it is politically unpalatable, and it is the govern-
ment's wish to avoid an affront to the investor or seemingly to
break a treaty or other understandings to which it is a party.
Thus, in this instance, the U.S. investor's residual treaty rights
have not proved an effective instrument in assisting him in for-
eign investments. It is interesting to note that in Mexico when
foreign persons set up a company, the permit they must obtain
will include a condition that a "Calvo Clause" be inserted in the
49. TIAS 4625, 11 UST 2398.
50. See also 1965 Proceedings of Section on International Law of the
American Bar Association (Report of Committee on Commercial Treaties)
at 215.
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bylaws and stock certificates, through which the foreign investor
waives the right to foreign diplomatic intervention.
It is worth repeating that in making a foreign investment, one
of the considerations the U.S. investor will wish to keep in mind
at the outset is whether there are any restrictions of the invest-
ment in the event that he wishes to dispose of it at a future date.
Specifically, may he dispose of his investment only to prospective
indigenous buyers, or may he sell to any buyer, including a fellow
U.S. investor? If there are restrictions, will he be able to repa-
triate the payment? And if so, can it be in dollars or other hard
currency? If he has a partner in a foreign joint venture, can he
only sell to his partner? And if so, on what basis?
This article has dealt primarily with national government re-
strictions on foreign investment by U.S. firms, but mention should
also be made of the existence of state or local restrictions. Some
well-known restrictions exist, for example, in the Province of
Ontario, Canada, and in the Canton of Geneva, Switzerland, and
as practices of local governments may constitute a hurdle to the
potential U.S. investor, he needs to be mindful of them.
CONCLUSIONS
As has been the case for the last decade or more, foreign re-
strictions on U.S. investment are in a state of flux, and the direc-
tion of specific countries is hard to predict. Ironically, the most
restrictive countries in the past, such as those in Eastern Europe
and Japan, are becoming less restrictive. On the other hand, the
countries in which the U.S. investor has traditionally been able
to invest rather freely, such as Canada, Australia, and Germany,
are for varying reasons becoming more restrictive. Given this
changing situation, the U.S. investor must continually check the
legislative and regulatory structure applicable to his investment
on a local, national and country grouping level. He should keep
in mind that these restrictions may apply in varying degrees to
both new investment in its different forms and reinvestment.
Ideally-and this can have important practical results-his knowl-
edge should be such that he can anticipate policy shifts rather than
be forced to react defensively to new situations as they arise.
While foreign government restrictions frequently are time-con-
suming and difficult, they are not, in all instances, an unmitigated
evil. They may serve to ensure host government recognition of,
and hence some degree of responsibility for, an investment as well
as to define the terms of an investment. In this sense, the restric-
tions, provided they are not too onerous, have positive effects by
removing some uncertainties at the outset.
In evaluating foreign investment restrictions, the U.S. investor
should try to take the long view with respect to (1) his plans
to return earnings and profits in dollars or to repatriate the in-
vestment itself; (2) alternatives in the event he wishes to dissolve
a joint venture with a foreign partner; and (3) in the event a
joint venture is terminated, his freedom of action to control the
further use of his technology and/or to secure its return to him.
Frequently restrictions are not clearly visible, and the U.S. in-
vestor must obtain all the information he can from his overseas
lawyers and others, including U.S. government officials, on the im-
portant nuances of government and private attitudes. This is par-
ticularly appropriate in the developing world where governments
frequently are less self-confident and national sensitivities are
greater, but it is equally important for other areas such as France
and Japan.
The U.S. investor should address foreign restrictions not only in
terms of the penalties they carry for violations but also for the ef-
fect that a violation might have on the foreign government's
overall attitude toward his project, his investment objectives, and
the effect it might have on local public opinion. Crossing the
policies of a foreign government by violating its rules in a sensi-
tive area may, in fact, mean that the U.S. investor is blacklisted
in a practical sense and his future may be severely circumscribed.
For example, a questionable importation of machinery and equip-
ment may result in distrust of the foreign investor and foster con-
tinuing audits in the tax and customs areas.
The foreign investor should remember that he is a "guest." This
means that he should try to understand and comply with the rules.
It is also prudent to keep the host government officials informed
as to what he is trying to accomplish and how it is beneficial to
the host country. However, he should be wary at all times about
making promises (with respect to employment, exports, etc.)
which he may not be able to keep.
The U.S. investor also needs to be sensitive to objectives and
trends which appear to be developing in the host country. For ex-
ample, to what degree does the host country need or want the
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foreign investment he is currently proposing? 51 Have its poli-
cies on such investments become more or less restrictive over a
period of years? Furthermore, apart from national restrictions,
what is the possibility that regional restrictions, such as those in
the EEC or in the Andean Group, may impinge on his investment?
The investor will need to evaluate the effect of the restrictions
in terms of both cost and executive time to determine the effect
on the overall profitability of his investment. Will the restrictions
so hamper the operation of the investment that its profitability is
adversely affected? Will there be available sufficient key person-
nel to ensure compliance with the restrictions, and can such a time
allocation be justified in terms of the profit potential of the in-
vestment?
The U.S. investor will probably have to be more flexible than
in the past in accommodating foreign investment restrictions and
hostile attitudes towards foreign investment. In view of the inter-
national furor over the activities of "multinational corporations,"
more questions are being asked, both here and abroad, concerning
the desirability of the foreign investor's presence, and this has re-
sulted in a more restrictive context for such an investor. As re-
strictions increase, he may have to use different approaches in
meeting them. The joint venture with local participation may be
an international middle ground and a means of accommodating
both the host country's and the foreign investor's interests. It
provides a means of broadening the foreign investor's overseas
constituency (an important goal as noted at the beginning of this
article) and enables him to limit his financial exposure in invest-
ment areas where the risk is high. Even in those situations where
the U.S. investor has a minority equity position, he may be able,
through careful negotiation and draftsmanship, to ensure himself
an adequate voice in the key decisions concerning the venture.
Frequently, unarticulated but de facto restrictions on the U.S.
investor's freedom of action in host country areas exist in the
form of national differences in cultural, political, economic, and
religious theories. While there may not be legal restrictions asso-
ciated with these attitudes, the investor must be more sensitive
to these local differences to ensure the success of his investment.
51. In some countries, formal five-year plans may help the investor
situate his investment in the country's overall program of priorities.
To reduce uncertainties and to define risk parameters, a strong,
enforceable international investment code or treaty may be in or-
der. Such a code or treaty need not be an international straight
jacket, but could at least define the investor's rights and his pos-
sible recourse in the event that certain national actions were taken
which adversely affected his interests. From the standpoint of
the host country, such an understanding could define its right to
participation and consultation with respect to the taking by the
foreign investor of certain critical decisions which affected its in-
terest, such as the handling of plant closings. Hopefully, in most
cases, a mutually satisfactory course of action could be developed
after common consultation, but in the event of failure to agree,
there could be recourse to a body akin to the Conciliation Commis-
sion provided for in the draft Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. Failure to agree at this point could then mean recourse
to arbitration before a neutral arbitration forum. If time pres-
sures were great, the conciliation stage might be eliminated, and
the parties could proceed immediately to the arbitration of their
differences. A mandatory conciliation/arbitration procedure would
tend to force the parties to resolve their differences between them-
selves. The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID), a currently viable international institution
which was created under the aegis of the World Bank, provides fa-
cilities for conciliation/arbitration of disputes involving contracts
between States and nationals of other States when both parties
consent to the jurisdiction of the Centre. An arbitration tribunal
constituted under the auspices of the Centre is now arbitrating a
dispute between the government of Morocco, and Holiday Inns and
Occidental Petroleum Corporation.
While it is generally agreed that foreign investment which in-
troduces new capital and technology into developing host countries
is an important means of increasing national living standards, it
is also apparent that it is not always viewed in a positive manner
in the host countries. Nevertheless, there is a broad commonality
of interests between the host country and the U.S. investor which
should be fostered by both and, perhaps more importantly, needs
to be better articulated than has been the case in the past. The
challenge, then, is for both parties to keep these common interests
in focus. From the U.S. investor's standpoint, he must try to
avoid actions which provoke, or provide an excuse for, such re-
strictions and, the host country must avoid punitive-type actions
which serve no salutary economic or social purpose and work in
the long run against its best interests. Specifically, both should
[voL. 11: 27, 1973] Restrictions on U.S. Investments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
have due regard for the sensitivities and legitimate needs of the
other. When this is done on a consistent basis, constructive com-
promises can be achieved.
With respect to the countries of the developed world, the situa-
tion has a different tone. The U.S. itself has, during the past year,
become subject to keen foreign investor interest. Currently for-
eign investors may invest in the U.S. on a relatively unrestricted
basis. From the standpoint of the U.S., this can, in certain areas,
be a positive influence, particularly when it concerns communities
in economic distress. In my view, it behooves the U.S. and other
developed countries to push for the avoidance and elimination of
artificial restrictions on investment in the developed world. And
it is especially important that the U.S. be militant about pressing
for the elimination of restrictions which may be discriminatory
with respect to U.S. investors.
The signs are becoming increasingly clear that we are going to
see a marked increase in foreign direct investment in the U.S., and
this may well provoke such a reaction from domestic competitors
that it will force a very real test of our commitment to a truly in-
ternational economic order. When this comes, U.S. investors with
an international constituency may need to articulate their com-
monality of interest with these foreign investors in order to dis-
suade our own government from taking actions which may be un-
wise and unfair to such investors and which, in all likelihood,
could lead to retaliatory action in other countries.
